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Systemic Risk and Bank Size 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we analyse firm level systemic risk for US and European banks from 2004 to 
2012. We observe that common systemic risk indicators are primarily driven by firm size 
which implies an overriding concern for “too-big-to-fail” institutions. However, smaller 
banks may still pose considerable systemic threats, as exemplified by the Northern Rock 
debacle in 2007. By introducing a simple standardisation, we obtain new risk measures that 
often prove to be superior predictors of financial distress during the 2007-2009 subprime 
crisis. We conclude that the new measures could be a valuable addition to the existing 
indicators employed in Basel III to identify systemically important banks. 
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1. Introduction 
As a result of the sub-prime crisis of 2007-2009 and the sovereign debt crisis that followed, 
systemic risk in the finance industry has become a hot topic in academic and policy circles. 
This is because of the substantial damage a financial crisis may cause to the real economy (see, 
for example, Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996 and Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta 2002) and the fact 
that financial institutions do not internalize the costs of such negative externality. As a 
consequence, addressing systemic risk is at the heart of new financial regulation such as the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the new Basel III agreement. A capital surcharge is required by 
Basel III on domestic and global systemically important banks (BCBS, 2012 and 2013). On the 
other hand, the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly emphasizes the need to provide enhanced regulation 
of firms and sectors that pose systemic risk (Richardson, 2011). A Pigouvian tax has also been 
proposed to force systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) to internalise the costs 
of crises and thus reduce their severity (see Morris and Shin, 2008 and Acharya et al., 2011, 
Acharya et al 2016, Bosma, 2016). However, the first step towards any solution to the problem 
of systemic instability is the derivation of accurate systemic risk indicators and the correct 
identification of SIFIs. 
A variety of systemic risk measures has been proposed since the start of the sub-prime crisis. 
Bisias et al (2012) provide a comprehensive summary, and emphasise that there is no single 
“pressure gauge” that can fully detect crises. Indeed, Hansen (2013) warns that model 
misspecification can be a serious challenge when trying to devise systemic risk measures. A 
possible solution is suggested by Giglio Kelly and Pruitt (2016) who exploit the information 
content of a broad selection of systemic risk measures by combining them into indexes. Among 
the individual measures in the literature ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 is one of the most popular. Put forward by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), it uses quantile regressions to measure the increased Value-
at-Risk (VaR) of the financial system when a specific financial firm is in distress. Girardi and 
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Ergun (2013) generalize the original ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 by extending the definition of financial distress 
to include more severe events. Further refinements have been proposed by López-Espinosa et 
al (2015) and Sedunov (2016). While ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅  focuses on system losses conditional on a 
bank’s distress, most other indicators take the opposite view and determine the systemic risk 
posed by an institution as the institution’s loss conditional on system distress. The idea is that 
the more a bank is susceptible to market upheavals, the more it can contribute to the severity 
of a crisis. This second set of measures can be based on reduced form or structural model 
approaches. 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 as developed by Brownlees and Engle (2017) and Acharya, Engle and 
Richardson (2012) belongs to the former type. Lehar (2005)’s indicator is an example of the 
latter. It exploits the capital structure of a bank in a Merton-type framework to assess its default 
risk. This information is then embedded into a systemic risk indicator expressed as a regulator’s 
risk exposure to the bank’s default.  
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of standardised systemic risk 
measures. Although large banks are commonly considered of systemic importance and firm 
size is typically an important driver of systemic risk measures (see, for instance, De Jonghe, 
2010, Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven, 2012, Huang, Zhou and Zhu, 2012,Vallascas and Keasey, 
2012, Zhang et al 2015, Laeven et al, 2016, and Sedunov, 2016), there is growing evidence that 
size may not be a persistent determinant of systemic risk in past crises (Weiß, Bostandzic and 
Neumann, 2014), nor be a prominent contagion factor among large international banks (Lopez-
Espinosa et al, 2012 and 2013). We propose a standardisation of systemic risk indicators that 
enables us to control for the overshadowing effect of firm size and bring forth other factors that 
contribute to the systemic importance of an institution, namely interconnectedness and default 
risk. Specifically, interconnectedness has attracted a lot of interest in recent years and has led 
to the development of models of interbank lending and contagion through networks (Poledna 
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et al, 2015, Kanno, 2015, Hautsch et al, 2015, and Betz at al, 2016).2 Danielsson et al (2016) 
question the reliability of current systemic risk measures on the basis that they entail substantial 
estimation risk. Our standardized indicators could help to address this concern in that, even 
though they are straightforward extensions of existing models, yet they appear to improve 
systemic risk forecasting. 
Our second contribution is a new measure of systemic risk for individual banks. We propose 
a hybrid indicator that extends the structural model proposed by Lehar (2005) to embed a time 
varying default barrier. This is then combined with the conditional capital shortfall proposed 
by Brownlees and Engle (2017) and Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) to gauge bank 
distress in a crisis. Through a structural model, one can explicitly define a crisis as the joint 
default of a group of institutions. In Brownlees and Engle (2017), a crisis event is instead 
defined as a 40% decline in the 6-month cumulative return of a stock market index. However, 
not all large stock price corrections may trigger collective defaults.3 For instance, the burst of 
the internet bubble in the early 2000s led to a stock market contraction of about 50% from peak 
to trough (for S&P500 as well as FTSE100) but without the systemic implications seen during 
the recent Great Recession. In this sense, the crisis condition used by Brownlees and Engle 
(2017) is more “systematic”, while the structural model approach is more “systemic”. Our 
findings suggest that the systemic risk rankings produced by our new (non-standardised) hybrid 
indicator are consistent with the designation of systemic importance given to US and European 
banks by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and with rankings obtained by Brownlees and 
                                                 
2 Taking into account feedback loops, a network based structural model is also adopted by Gauthier, Lehar 
and Souissi (2012) to examine the impact of macro-prudential capital requirements on systemic risk. Paltalidis et 
al (2015) use networks to model contagion at the country level and find that sovereign risk is the most important 
channel that amplifies systemic risk in the Euro area. The nexus between systemic risk and sovereign risk is also 
confirmed by Pagano and Sedunov (2016) at the country level and by Black et al (2016) with a bank level analysis. 
3 While our definition of a financial crisis is also sensitive to negative stock market returns, a big drop in the 
market index is in itself not enough to trigger a systemic crisis. In our model, unlike in Brownlees and Engle 
(2017) the vulnerability of the banking system measured by its effective short term leverage is also important. It 
is conceivable that banks may not default even after a severe stock market contraction if their leverage is low. On 
the other hand, a milder erosion of market value might have systemic consequences in a high leverage scenario. 
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Engle (2017)’s indicator. Such consistency is not unexpected as it is primarily driven by size 
effects. Moreover, the standardised version of our hybrid indicator appears to be one of the best 
predictors of bank distress, across all other indicators studied in the paper. Occasionally, it 
outperforms all the other measures in our out-of-sample tests. Specifically, for US banks, the 
new standardised measure is the best pre-crisis predictor of the largest contractions in bank 
stocks during the 2007-2009 crisis. For European banks, it is the best in-crisis predictor of the 
largest stock price drops during the second phase of the crisis. The unquestionable relevance 
of size as a core systemic risk factor combined with the importance of non-size factors when 
predicting bank risk in a crisis lead to the conclusion that standardised and non-standardised 
measures complement one another and both should be considered by financial researchers and 
for regulatory purposes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology. Section 
3 introduces the sample and data sources. Section 4 presents our empirical results and Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
In this Section, we first develop our hybrid systemic risk indicator, 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅. Then, we discuss 
our standardisation procedure to control for size effects.  
 
2.1 A hybrid systemic risk indicator 
In order to measure the systemic risk posed by individual institutions, we define financial 
distress as the event that occurs when a bank’s assets fall below the bank’s debt at a future time 
t. The actual market value of total assets of a financial firm Ai,t is not observable in that a bank’s 
portfolio is composed of both traded securities and non-traded assets. As a result, we model 
equity as contingent claims (a call option) on the bank’s assets and back out the asset value 
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accordingly. One may argue that this procedure may not be appropriate as the efficiency of 
stock markets during a crisis has been called into question. If stock prices are not efficient or 
rational, then the information they convey is poor. Although this may be true, a sharp 
contraction of a firm’s stock price, whether in an efficient or inefficient market, can generate 
serious disruption for the firm and may have contagion implications for other firms as clearly 
exemplified by the free fall in stock prices of a number of banks after the Lehman Brother 
default in 2008. So, whether a stock price is efficient or not, its variation may have systemic 
repercussions. Further, as maintained by Malkiel (2011), it is unlikely that the no arbitrage 
hypothesis that underpins market efficiency was violated during the subprime crisis. In other 
words, although stock prices were not measuring firm value accurately, it is doubtful that 
investors could rely on other value indicators or information that were systematically more 
accurate than stock prices. Put another way, when there is thick fog, nobody can see clearly. 
Indeed, systemic risk indicators based on stock prices and contingent claim analysis are very 
common both in the literature and among practitioners, especially when analysing crisis periods, 
as summarized in Bisias et al. (2012) and Blancher et al. (2013). Examples include Lehar 
(2005), Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007), the International Monetary Fund (2009), Suh (2012), 
and Jobst and Gray (2013).  
Debt Di,t, our “effective” level of short term indebtedness which represents the default 
trigger for bank i, is difficult to determine due to the complexity and opaqueness of a bank’s 
balance sheet, as pointed out, for example, by Crosbie and Bohn (2003). To quantify Di,t, we 
need to take into account short-term debt and part of long-term debt as suggested by Moody’s 
KMV and Vassalou and Xing (2004).4 However, instead of choosing a somewhat arbitrary 
portion of long-term debt to determine the default trigger (it is 50% in the Moody’s KMV 
                                                 
4 Vassalou and Xing (2004) state: “It is important to include long term debt in our calculations for two reasons. 
First, firms need to service their long-term debt, and these interest payments are part of their short term liabilities. 
Second, the size of long term debt affects the ability of a firm to roll over its short-term debt, and therefore reduce 
its risk of default.” 
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model), we assume, similarly to Suh (2012), that the Di,t is a portion of total liabilities Li,t, 
namely Di,t = δi,tLi,t. Note that, unlike in Suh’s paper, δi,t, our percentage “default barrier”, is 
time-varying because we intend to capture the changing market perception of the barrier over 
time.  
Assuming that the asset value of a bank follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), 
under the risk-neutral measure, the bank’s equity Ei,t can be seen as a call option on the bank’s 
assets with a strike price equal to debt with maturity at T (𝐷𝑖,𝑇). Following Ronn and Verma 
(1986) and Lehar (2005), we assume that all debt issued by the bank is insured and hence 
riskless. It follows that its yield must be the risk-free rate. Then, the present value of debt, that 
is the discounted value of the strike price in the call option pricing equation 𝑒−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡)Di,T, will 
simply be the debt’s current value 𝐷𝑖,𝑡. So, a bank’s stock price can be expressed as: 
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝑁(𝑑1𝑡) − 𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑁(𝑑2𝑡)                                                                                                          (1)                                                                                                                                                  
 
with  
𝑑1𝑡 =
ln (𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + (
𝜎2
2 ) 𝑇⁄
𝜎√𝑇
 
𝑑2𝑡=𝑑1𝑡 − 𝜎√𝑇 
 
where σ is the asset return volatility, T is assumed to be 1 year, following the convention, and 
N(∙) is the cumulative standard normal density function. 
The assumption that all bank debt was effectively insured during the crisis is supported by 
the extensive guarantees given (implicitly or explicitly) by governments to bank debt, including 
non-deposit liabilities, during the sub-prime crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013). To 
take into account changes in the capital structure of the banks, which may be pronounced during 
8 
 
crises, we update our estimates of Di,t = δi,tLi,t on a monthly basis. The value of δi,t, the implied 
default threshold as perceived by the market, is obtained from monthly maximum likelihood 
estimations. The value of Li,t, though available with quarterly frequency, is updated monthly, 
through interpolation, to reflect the trend observed in the current quarter as in Anginer, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Zhu (2014). In this way we incorporate changes in leverage in a timely 
manner.  
We apply the maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Duan (1994) and Duan (2000)5 
to estimate the parameters of interest of (1): 
 
𝐿(𝐸, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝛿) = −
𝑚 − 1
2
ln(2𝜋) − (𝑚 − 1)ln(𝜎) 
                          − ∑ 𝑙𝑛?̃?𝑡 − ∑ ln (𝑁(?̃?1𝑡)) −
𝑚
𝑡=2
𝑚
𝑡=2
1
2𝜎2
∑ [ln (
?̃?𝑡
?̃?𝑡−1
) − 𝜇]
2𝑚
𝑡=2
                              (2) 
 
where m is the number of observations and 𝜇 is the expected asset return. The estimation of 
𝜇, 𝜎, 𝛿 and 𝐴𝑡 follows an iterative procedure. First, 𝜎 and 𝛿 are given an initial value. Then, the 
estimate of 𝐴𝑡 (?̃?𝑡) is implied from equation (1). Next, parameters 𝜇, 𝜎 and 𝛿 are obtained by 
maximising the likelihood function in equation (2). Following this, the estimated 𝜎 and 𝛿 are 
used as new initial values. Iterations stop when the increase in the value of the likelihood 
function or the change of parameters is smaller than 1e-8.  
For each bank in our sample, the monthly time series of total assets 𝐴𝑡and the corresponding 
parameters of the process σ, µ and δ are estimated, using a rolling window of the previous 
twenty-four months, as in Lehar (2005).  
                                                 
5 We thank Jin-Chuan Duan and Tao Wang for sharing their Matlab code. 
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After the time series of total assets has been derived, we measure time-varying asset 
volatilities and correlations through the well-known EWMA model: 
                                                                       
𝜎𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆𝜎𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆) ln (
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) ln (
𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
)                                                                          (3) 
 
where  𝜎𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the covariance between asset returns of bank i and j at time t. Following the 
RiskMetrics framework developed by J.P. Morgan, the decay factor 𝜆 is set equal to 0.94.  
For each month in the sample period, a variance-covariance matrix (Σt) can be estimated 
using Equation (3). The matrix will be employed in Monte Carlo simulations to take into 
account banks’ “interconnectedness” when calculating overall systemic risk in the industry and 
the systemic risk contribution of individual banks. Following Lehar (2005), we define overall 
systemic risk as the probability of a crisis event which occurs when the proportion of the assets 
of distressed banks to the total assets of all banks exceeds a certain threshold θ (e.g.  θ =10%) 
over the next six months:6 
 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠]                      
                                              = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[∑ (𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1𝒊 |𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 < 𝛿𝑖,𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1) >θ∑ 𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1𝒊 ]                    (4) 
 
where we assume that 𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 .7 
We derive the systemic risk contribution of a bank, SYR, as the bank’s expected capital 
shortfall during a crisis: 
                                                 
6 An overall systemic risk index can also be calculated in terms of the number of banks in distress, see Lehar 
(2005) and Suh (2012). 
7 Here, for simplicity, we assume that the growth rate of liabilities is zero. This does not appear to be a strong 
assumption in our setup because equation (4) is estimated every month and bank liabilities are updated with that 
frequency based on trends observed in financial statements at the start and end of the current quarter. So, any 
changes in leverage would be promptly reflected in our systemic risk measures. 
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𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =E[(k𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1)⃒Crisis]                                                                                    (5)                      
where k is the minimum leverage, measured as an equity-to-asset ratio, which is set in Basel 
III at 3% of total assets.8 𝑘𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 then represents a non-risk based minimum capital requirement. 
According to Basel III regulation such a requirement appears to be a necessary complement to 
risk based capital measures because it is less subject to manipulation by banks and not 
influenced by inherent problems in regulatory risk weights.9 
A relative measure of 𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡  that takes into account the systemic importance of a bank in 
relation to the systemic risk in the financial system can be easily calculated as: 
                                                                                
𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
∑ (𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ǀ 𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 > 0)𝑖
                                                                                                    (6) 
 
In order to compute the above systemic risk variables, at each point in time in the sample 
period, Monte Carlo simulations are used to generate future scenarios of bank-specific asset 
values. In each scenario, the multivariate distribution of predicted asset values at a given future 
horizon (e.g. in 6 months) is obtained by using the Cholesky-decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix (Σt) estimated with the EWMA model. So, a scenario s at time t+1 is 
generated as: 
 
Ai,t+1
s = Ai,t exp (μi,tT + Chol(Σt)
Tεt√T −
1
2
σi
2T)                                                                      (7)                                                                   
                                                 
8 Replacing 3% with 8%, as in 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾, does not qualitatively change our results. 
9 For example, the internal rating based approach in Basel II uses risk weights that are based on several 
assumptions (e.g. single risk factor model, well diversified portfolio, ...) which may not be appropriate for all 
banks across all portfolios. 
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where Chol(Σt)  is an upper triangular matrix so that Σt = Chol(Σt)TChol(Σt)  and εt  is a 
standard normal random variable. We simulate Ai,t+1s  for 100,000 scenarios simultaneously for 
all banks, each month in the sample period. 
 
2.2 Standardisation of systemic risk measures 
In this work in addition to 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅 we also consider other popular systemic risk indicators to 
do comparative tests of their predictive power. These other measures are Brownlees and Engle 
(2017)'s 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)’s ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 and Lehar (2005)’s expected 
shortfall (𝐸𝑆). As we find that firm size is often a dominant contributing factor in popular 
systemic risk measures, which can overshadow other factors (e.g. leverage and 
interconnectedness), we also employ standardized versions of all the above. For all indicators, 
except ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅, standardisation is achieved by simply dividing the original measure by the 
bank’s total assets. ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 is not amenable to this type of standardisation as it is expressed 
in terms of the total loss suffered by the system (when a bank is in distress) rather than the loss 
suffered by a bank (𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅 and 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾) or the bank level contribution to systemic risk (𝐸𝑆). As 
the system is normally proxied with the stock index of the banking sector, for ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 we 
counteract the effect of bank size by computing the index with equal weights rather than value 
weights. This way, bank size will effectively be standardised, as all banks will equally influence 
the index. Definitions of all the systemic measures used in this study are summarised in 
Appendix 2. 
 
3. Data 
We conduct our study on US and European banks for the period December 2001 to 
December 2012. Our sample includes all Euro area countries which joined the Eurozone before 
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2002. We add three more countries with large systemically important banks: the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden. We first select all commercial banks and investment 
banks10 active at the end of 2006 and available in Compustat North America (for US banks) 
and Compustat Global (for European banks). Then, following Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong 
(2016) (1) we exclude micro-banks, with assets below $10bn in the US (€10bn in Europe), as 
they are unlikely to pose any systemic threat11; and (2) we classify the remaining institutions 
as small/large if they have assets below/above $50bn as of December 2006. Dead banks are 
retained to address survivorship bias. Next, we apply similar filters, as in Zhang et al. (2015) 
to ensure that for each bank we have 1) sufficient data to estimate all the eight measures of 
systemic risk included in this study, over a period of two consecutive years; and 2) more than 
80% of non-zero stock returns over the sample period to avoid thin trading biases. Our final 
sample consists of 83 US banks and 55 European banks. A list of selected banks is reported in 
Appendix 1. We collect daily stock prices, number of shares outstanding and quarterly balance 
sheet data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global.  
As of December 2006, our US sample represents approximately 95% of the total assets of 
all listed banks in the US which are were available in Compustat North America and had an 
asset value over 5 million US dollars. Similarly, the European banks covered in our sample 
represent approximately 99% of the total assets of all listed banks (with an asset value over 5 
million US dollars) in the 12 European countries studied in the paper. Despite the broad 
coverage, our methodology based on stock price information implies that our sample is limited 
to listed banks. This means that our work does not extend to state-owned banks and banks 
organised as cooperatives.12 These types may be systemically important and will need to be 
                                                 
10 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes 4010 and 402030. 
11  This threshold is commonly used by the Federal Reserve to identify community banks. See 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/community_banking.htm. 
12 When compared with the banks included in the 2011 stress tests conducted by the European Banking 
Authority, our sample provides a good representation of important banks in Europe, especially in Belgium, France, 
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studied with a different approach. Given the extensive coverage of our study, it is unlikely that 
excluded banks could materially affect our aggregate systemic risk indicators. Although 
excluded institutions may have a limited impact on systemic risk rankings of individual banks, 
there is no reason to believe that they would meaningfully alter the cross-sectional or time 
series properties of our bank-specific systemic risk measures and the findings of our panel 
analyses.  
 
4. Empirical findings 
In this Section, we present our analysis of non-standardised (NS) and standardised (S) 
systemic risk measures in the US and Europe. We start by comparing the systemic risk rankings 
produced by these measures. Next, we investigate the role of bank size and other balance sheet 
information as their determinants. Finally, we test the ability of our battery of measures to 
predict “realised” systemic risk during the recession period.  
To set the scene, we first apply the methodology explained in Section 2.1 to measure the 
magnitude of overall systemic risk in the banking sector. We assume that a systemic event 
occurs when the proportion of the assets of distressed banks to the total assets of all banks 
exceeds a threshold θ within a predetermined time horizon τ. This represents a scenario when 
normal banking intermediation is severely disrupted and credit supply is reduced to the extent 
that the real economy is adversely affected. In line with the previous literature (Lehar, 2005 
and Suh, 2012), we choose θ=10% and  τ=0.5 years.13 So a plausible banking sector-wide 
systemic risk measure is the probability of having such a systemic event given by equation (4). 
Figure 1 shows the time series of overall systemic risk from December 2003 until December 
2012 for both the US and the European banking systems. It is clear that the period with the 
                                                 
Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the UK. However, we are unable to cover a large number of unlisted banks in Germany 
and Spain, even though the largest institutions in these countries are included in our study. 
13 As a robustness check, we derive overall and bank specific systemic risk measures with θ equal to 5% and 
20%, instead of the 10% used for our reported results. We do not find significant changes in our findings. 
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highest probability of a systemic event occurred during the sub-prime crisis of 2007-2009, in 
both regions. As one would expect, systemic risk increases sharply around the time of critical 
events, such as the Bear Stearns bailout (March 2008), the Lehman Brothers failure (September 
2008) and at the time of increased concerns for a Greek default (Summer 2011).  
 
4.1. Systemic risk rankings 
Often, institutions that are too-big-to-fail are also considered to be systemically important 
and vice versa. However, as evidenced by the Norther Rock debacle, smaller institutions can 
also pose systemic threats. And large institutions that have low risk and are well capitalised 
may not necessarily be systemic. In other words, size, though an important systemic risk factor 
may not be the only or the dominant one.  
In addition to 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅 we extend our analysis by considering other well-known indicators and 
by deriving their standardised counterparts. To exemplify the differences/similarities among 
various systemic risk indicators, in Appendix 3 we report a snapshot of their rankings of US 
banks (Panel A) and European banks (Panel B) as of December 2011. We also show the 
(unranked) list of SIFIs released by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in November 2011.14 
It is interesting to note that for the US (European) banks the ranking based on our indicator 
𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅 shares 17 (19) out of 20 top risky banks with Brownlees and Engle (2017)’s indicator 
SRISK. The consistency of our results with SRISK is further confirmed with their high 
correlation during the sample period as shown in Table 1 (0.52 for US banks and 0.90 for 
European banks). More importantly, the 8 (14) systemically important US (European) banks 
identified by the FSB are captured within the top 12 (18) in the ranking of 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅. At the same 
time, Appendix 3 also highlights the multifaceted nature of systemic risk as revealed by ranking 
                                                 
14 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations 
about the global financial system. It was established after the G-20 London summit in April 2009 as a successor 
to the Financial Stability Forum. 
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differences across measures. Specifically, in contrast to the similarity between 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅  and 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 and ES only share 6 and 11 banks respectively of the top 20 identified by 
𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅 in their top 20 lists for the US sample. Similar results are obtained for the European 
sample. Another interesting observation from Appendix 3 is that standardization makes a 
difference. For instance, of the top 20 institutions according to rSYR, only 9 (13) enter the top 
20 ranking after standardisation for the US (European) sample.  
The above findings are corroborated by our rank correlation analysis conducted on quarterly 
systemic risk rankings over our full sample period (December 2003 – December 2012) as well 
as the pre-crisis and crisis periods.  For each quarter 𝑡, we compute pair-wise rank correlations 
for the indicators of interest and then average them over time. Panel A of Table 1 reports the 
results for the US and Europe over the full sample period. Figure 2 summarises the above 
information by showing, for each indicator in the NS and S groups, the average rank correlation 
between the indicator and the others within the same group. To control for the effect of the 
larger proportion of smaller banks that may create noisy rankings in the US sample relative to 
the European sample (the proportion of banks with total assets below $50bn is 63% and 18% 
respectively in the two regions) in Figure 2 we also report the results obtained from a subsample 
restricted to the top 30 institutions by asset size in each region. We find that overall, there is 
substantially positive correlation within NS and S measures, with S measures being less 
correlated. Controlling for sample size does not appear to alter the outcome. This suggests a 
reassuring degree of convergence in the assessment of systemic risk. But there are also 
noticeable differences, as highlighted, for NS measures, by previous literature (Giglio, Kelly 
and Pruitt 2016, Danielsson et al. 2016, and Zhang et al. 2015). For instance, we observe that 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 has a markedly lower correlation with other NS measures, which is consistent with 
the low average correlation between 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 and ∆CoVaR documented in Benoit et al. (2014). 
This is to be expected as ∆CoVaR represents the risk of the financial system conditional on a 
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specific institution being in distress. By contrast, the other NS measures studied in the paper 
take a different perspective and portray the risk of an institution conditional on a shock to the 
financial system. In a crisis, the behaviour of banks and their index becomes more synchronised 
which implies that ∆CoVaR does not vary as much across banks as for other measures. This 
makes it more likely to produce discordant rankings. Similarly, standardised ∆CoVaR has a 
rather low average correlation (negative in the US sample and across regions when looking at 
the top 30 banks) with other S measures. We also observe that NS measures are always more 
correlated in Europe than in the US. This may follow as in the European sample there is a 
markedly higher proportion of very large banks.15 This applies to the full regional cohorts and 
the ones restricted to the top 30 banks. Since NS measures are primarily driven by size, they 
will then be more likely to produce consistent rankings for a larger section of the European 
sample. On the other hand, the average rank correlations of S measures are more similar 
between the two regions, especially when the top 30 banks are considered. The correlation 
analysis results are confirmed when we split the sample between pre-crisis and crisis periods 
(see Figure 3). 
 
To illustrate the role played by bank size in systemic risk rankings we compute average 
correlations between the eight systemic risk indicators and size. Results are reported in Table 
1 Panel A and graphically summarised in Figure 4. The dominant effect of size is rather obvious 
for 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅, 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 and 𝐸𝑆 in the European sample with rank correlations of 99%, 89% and 70% 
respectively. In the US, the values are lower due to the prominence of smaller banks in the 
sample, but still substantial with an average correlation across NS measures of 49%. As one 
would expect, S measures are considerably less correlated with size, a result which is consistent 
                                                 
15 There are only 4 banks with assets above $1tr in the US sample while there are 13 in the European sample. 
Furthermore, the Herfindahl index in the US and Europe (and its normalised version) is 0.076 and 0.045 (0.063 
and 0.027), respectively (see Panel B in Table 1). 
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across measures. This suggests that standardization may be effective as a way to control for the 
overshadowing effect of bank size. This in turn may be useful as a means of identifying medium 
and small banks that can be systemically relevant or larger banks that may not pose substantial 
or imminent systemic threats. Further, smaller banks may represent a considerable proportion 
of the local banking industry, which implies that the fragility of a few small banks may cause 
concerns about the fragility of many others. This is sometimes referred to as the “too-many-to-
fail” problem (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007), which has recently drawn attention and 
triggered robust counter-systemic measures in Italy.16  
 
4.2. Determinants of systemic risk measures 
To the extent that systemic risk measures can reflect the systemic importance of an 
institution, it is of interest to investigate their determinants. We draw from a selection of 
balance sheet indicators to see if systemic risk can be readily inferred from accounting 
information. Our priors are that systemic risk should be positively related to size (measured as 
logarithm of total assets), at least for the NS measures, and leverage, which is a common default 
risk proxy. By contrast, systemic risk should be negatively related to asset growth, as healthy 
institutions tend to expand. However, as before the subprime crisis many banks were fast 
expanding in risky markets, we control for the possible negative effect of abnormal high 
expansion with a quadratic term for growth. Higher equity capital (especially for poorly 
                                                 
16 The Financial Times reported that “Atlante, a privately backed €5bn fund rushed into existence in April to 
quell the threat of contagion from struggling lenders, took control of Veneto Banca (€33bn in assets as of 
2015) … and Popolare di Vicenza (€40bn in assets), another regional bank, last month.” (Financial Times 30 
June 2016). “ … the woes of Popolare di Vicenza, which is tiny in relation to the €4tn Italian banking industry, 
should be little more than a footnote in the history of European banking… Instead its shortcomings have triggered 
fears of nationwide contagion and aroused Europe-wide concerns, and this has forced Italian authorities to 
lean on some of the country’s strongest institutions to stump up billions of euros; the fear is that a regional bank 
has become too entwined with the rest of the Italian financial system to fail. …a bail-in of an Italian bank 
[where losses are forced on private investors] may cause a chain reaction … across the European banking 
system. … “We cannot go bust for €2.5bn,” says the chief executive of one of Italy’s largest banks, one of a 
dozen bosses who raced to Rome to find the government waiting, cap in hand.” Financial Times, April 15, 2016 
[emphasis added]. 
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capitalized banks), asset liquidity, profitability and deposit ratios should also be negatively 
related to systemic risk as they are typically associated with bank resilience (see Brownlees, 
2011, Lehar, 2005, Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven, 2012, and Lopez-Espinosa et al, 2013). 
Specifically, we measure profitability as return on assets (ROA) and liquidity as the sum of 
available-for-sale and held-to-maturity securities over total assets, as in Landier, Sraer and 
Thesmar (2016).  
Table 2 contains summary statistics of our regression variables (Panel A) and their pairwise 
correlations (Panel B) for the US and European samples. Following Brunnermeier, Dong and 
Palia (2012), quarterly fixed-effects are included in our regressions. We are aware that our 
dependent variables, i.e. our S and NS measures, come from a first-stage estimation, which 
may introduce measurement error and, as a result, heteroscedasticity. Since we do not obtain 
detailed information about the possible measurement error, we use White period standard errors 
to account for heteroscedasticity (as in Weiß, Bostandzic and Neumann, 2014), as well as 
possible autocorrelation (see Petersen, 2009) in the regression residuals.17 Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. 
Multivariate regression results are shown in Table 3. Systemic risk measures as the 
dependent variables are divided into non-standardized and standardized groups. As we observe 
high kurtosis for 𝐸𝑆 and 𝑠𝐸𝑆 due to outliers, in the regressions we replace them with 𝑙𝑛(1 +
𝐸𝑆) and 𝑙𝑛(1 +  𝑠𝐸𝑆 ∗  1,000,000) respectively. Despite the distinct designs and emphases of 
the various NS systemic risk measures, we find that, when statistically significant, results are 
broadly in line with expectations and are consistent across the four measures in both geographic 
regions. As one would expect, banks with larger size, higher leverage and lower profitability 
tend to be more systemically important in the following quarter. The negative and 
                                                 
17 The time fixed effect dummies included in our regressions also help to remove the contemporaneous 
correlation between observations. Unreported robustness tests using alternative standard error specifications 
confirm that White period standard errors are the most conservative.  
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counterintuitive coefficient of leverage obtained from the ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅  regression for the US 
sample (model 3) is the only exception. This should not be of much concern because most of 
the explanatory power in model 3 comes from the time fixed effects (with an R-squared of 
0.872 against a total of 0.880), leaving little variation in ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 to be explained by bank 
characteristics. It is worth noting that in the US, the R-squared of regressions with the size 
factor alone is rather high for 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅 and 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 (0.659 and 0.301 respectively), but rather small 
for ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 (0.02), which is consistent with the finding observed in Figure 4 that ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 is 
the least correlated with size. The significant coefficients of Assets Growth and Assets Growth2 
in column 4 for US banks and in columns 1 and 4 for European banks confirm our conjecture 
that higher asset growth helps to reduce a bank’s systemic risk contribution. However, banks 
expanding too fast tend to be more systemically risky (which is captured by the quadratic asset 
growth term in the regression). Again, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 exhibits counterintuitive signs for the growth 
variables in the US sample.  
Turning to S indicators, standardization is meant to “strip away” the size effects, which can 
be dominant for some traditional systemic risk measures. Results in Table 3 for both regions 
reassure us that our standardization is effective, but to differing degrees. The size-only R-
squared decreases after standardization for all four NS measures without any exception. 
Consistent with our previous findings (see Figure 4), the reduction in the explanatory power of 
size for 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅 and 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 is the most pronounced in both regions. As the size-only R-squared 
falls to almost zero across all S measures in the US sample, it is not surprising to see that size 
is mostly insignificant for these indicators. In stark contrast, size remains an important 
determinant even after standardization for the European sample (see columns 5 through 8 in 
Panel B). This suggests that a European bank’s systemic risk may grow more than 
proportionally to its size.  
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To illustrate the impact of capital regulation on systemic risk measures we have included 
the tier 1 ratio in our regressions in Table 3. To account for the possible asymmetric 
implications on systemic risk of tier 1 ratio for well capitalized and less capitalized (LC) banks 
(see Lehar, 2005), we also include in our regressions an interaction term 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐿𝐶, 
where 𝐿𝐶 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank’s tier 1 ratio is less than 10% (our sample 
average). It is interesting to note that in both regions and across S and NS measures, there does 
not appear to be a consistent relationship between the tier 1 capital ratio and our systemic risk 
measures. This is not surprising. On the one hand, a higher tier 1 ratio should lead to lower 
systemic risk because better capitalised banks are, all else equal, safer. On the other hand, 
regulators can exercise discretion to increase minimum capital requirements18 when they are 
concerned about the safety or the systemic risk of a bank.19 So, a higher tier 1 ratio may also 
be related to higher systemic risk. The combination of these opposing relations between tier 1 
capital and systemic risk can cause inconsistencies in regression results and the inference that 
can be made with different measures even within the same geographical region. For instance, 
in the US sample, when the tier 1 ratio increases, sRISK decreases for poorly capitalised banks, 
that is, the (unreported) sum of the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐿𝐶 and 
the coefficient of Tier 1 ratio is negative and significant. But, it increases for highly capitalized 
banks, i.e. the coefficient of Tier 1 ratio is positive and significant. This suggests that the 
relation between tier 1 ratio and systemic risk, as detected by this particular measure, depends 
on the financial soundness of a bank (i.e. whether it is well capitalized). However, when 
systemic risk is measured by 𝑠∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅, it decreases as tier 1 ratio increases, regardless of 
                                                 
18 Basel II, which was in force for most of the observations period, spells out the principles on which bank 
supervision should be based. Principle 3 states that “Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the 
minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum.” (BCBS 2006, p. 211). 
19 Basel III formally introduced higher capital buffers for large-systemic banks in 2016. The new rules were 
not in place during the sample period but national regulators and banks may have made adjustments well before 
the official date when the new rules were introduced. 
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whether a bank is well capitalized or not. Inconsistencies across different systemic risk 
measures are also observed in the European sample. 
Overall, if we look beyond size effects, we find more significant and expected coefficients 
across S measures than for NS measures. This confirms the argument that other risk elements 
can be overshadowed in traditional systemic risk indicators.  
 
4.3. Predicting realised systemic risk 
In this section we test the ability of NS and S measures to predict the effects of systemic risk 
during the crisis in terms of individual banks’ (1) stock price contractions, (2) default and (3) 
inclusion in government bailout programmes. 
 
4.3.1. Stock price contractions 
First, we look at how S and NS measures computed before the subprime crisis (2007Q2) 
can predict large stock price contractions during the crisis. Specifically, we employ probit 
models where the dependent variable takes value 1 when a bank’s stock price falls more than 
80% or 90% between 2007Q3 and 2009Q1.20 We start by employing systemic risk measures 
in univariate regressions for a direct comparison of their predictive ability. We then add bank 
size as a further explanatory variable. This is useful as there is no agreement in the literature 
regarding the importance of size as a systemic risk predictor. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 
4, size has high rank correlation with NS measures and should already be reflected in them. 
But it could add further explanatory power to the regressions because other systemic risk 
factors in the NS measures (e.g. interconnectedness and default risk factors) may interfere and 
prevent it from fully expressing its forecasting ability. However as, in some instances, we detect 
                                                 
20 Banks that disappeared before the end of the crisis due to default or delisting are considered to have had a 
stock price contraction of 100%. 
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clear signs of multicollinearity, we replace size with its component that is orthogonal to the 
relevant NS measure. For consistency we do so across all NS measures and throughout our 
analysis, unless otherwise stated. The results of large stock price contraction forecasts are 
reported in Table 4. When we look at univariate regressions, we find that, in the US, most S 
measures are statistically significant for both 80% and 90% stock price drops. For NS measures 
only 𝐸𝑆 is consistently significant whether or not we control for size. Interestingly, across all 
specifications, it is always an S measure, 𝑠𝑆𝑌𝑅, that holds the highest explanatory power, as 
measured by pseudo R-squared. To further gauge predictive power of significant systemic risk 
measures we also use the percentage of correctly classified distressed banks and the percentage 
of correct classifications across all banks as in Zhang et al (2015). To identify banks that are 
correctly classified, we employ, for each relevant regression specification, the ratio between 
the observed number of distressed banks and the total number of banks as a cut-off point. Then, 
a distressed bank will be correctly classified if its distress probability obtained through the 
probit model is above the cut-off point, while a correctly classified non-distress bank will have 
its distress probability below the cut-off point. Again, sSYR produces the highest levels of 
correct classifications for US banks. Specifically, 75% and 76% of distressed banks are 
correctly classified when considering an 80% and 90% drop in stock prices, respectively. When 
we look at the European sample in Panel B, only 𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 is always significant. Then, both the 
US and European samples show that S indicators are better pre-crisis predictors of crisis-related 
stock price contractions than NS indicators. Interestingly, size does not appear to have 
predictive power when used alone. But it becomes significant in the US sample when regressed 
alongside 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 and 𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅.  
One may argue that it is unlikely that a bank’s market-based systemic risk measures could 
predict its stock price decline over the next 7 quarters. Indeed, the market largely did not 
anticipate the severity of the subprime crisis. Therefore, we have repeated our analysis by using 
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systemic measures estimated in 2008Q1 (rather than 2007Q2), that is 2 quarters into the crisis, 
but well before the peak represented by the Lehman default in September 2008. Then, in Table 
5 we report predictions of banks’ stock contractions in the following 4 quarters. Considering 
stock price drops of 80% and 90% from 2008Q2 (rather than from 2007Q3 as done in Table 4) 
implies that in Table 5 we look at harsher bank distress levels. This is because stock prices had 
already started to fall prior to 2008Q2. Combining this stronger distress level with systemic 
risk indicators now measured after the wake-up call of the first signs of system instability 
causes most NS and S measures to become statistically significant in the US market. In most 
cases, they also improve their forecasting ability, as measured by the pseudo R-squared and 
correct classification indicators. For price falls of 80%, it is not obvious which type of systemic 
indicator dominates as the top performing NS and S measures, 𝐸𝑆 and 𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 respectively, 
have a similar R-squared of about 30%, whether we control for size or not. But if we look at 
the percentage of correctly classified distressed banks, an indicator that is more relevant for 
regulators and policy makers, S measures dominate with sSRISK and sES rightly predicting 
88.9% of the largest bank stock contractions, without size as a control. For the larger drop of 
90%, the correct classification of distressed banks for the two standardised measures increases 
further to 93.3%. Although size, when regressed alone, is statistically significant in the US for 
both price drops, it is hardly significant when combined with NS systemic risk measures. This 
is also the case for S measures, as the size effect may be present after standardisation. For 
instance, standardised measures can reflect the fact that large banks may be more systemic 
because they are more interconnected and tend to have higher default risk.21 As far as Europe 
is concerned, Table 5 Panel B shows that the statistical significance of all systemic risk 
indicators is almost non-existent except for our newly introduced S measure, 𝑠𝑆𝑌𝑅.22 Size is 
                                                 
21 With an international sample, Doupos et al 2015 show that larger banks, all else being equal, tend to have 
lower Z-scores, an indication of higher default risk. 
22 The European results are puzzling and may be due to the interplay of more than one factor. First, the 
subprime crisis may have affected different national markets in Europe at different times. So, stock contractions 
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not significant when regressed alone and hardly ever significant when used as a control. The 
overall conclusion from our analysis of stock price contractions in the crisis period is that when 
systemic risk is assessed shortly after the start of the crisis, top performing S measures are 
either similar or more powerful predictors of realised systemic risk in the US. S measures 
become more dominant as the level of bank distress increases. In contrast, S measures appear 
to be the only ones that can forecast large stock price contractions in Europe. 
 
4.3.2. Bank failure 
We now extend our comparison of NS and S indicators by assessing their predictions of 
bank failures during the crisis. In our definition of bank failure we include banks that default 
or are delisted, for instance following a merger.23 We do not include banks that received bailout 
money, unless they subsequently fail or are delisted. We do this for two reasons: (1) we do a 
separate analysis of bank bailouts in Section 4.3.3 and, (2) there is strong evidence that being 
the recipient of a government bailout is not necessarily correlated with the level of distress of 
the financial institution. In the US, banks that received capital injections as part of the Capital 
Purchase Programme sponsored by the government were found to have stronger fundamentals 
than banks that did not participate in the Program (Ng, Vasvari and Moerman, 2011).  
Figure 5 shows some preliminary evidence of the relative effectiveness of NS and S 
indicators as applied to well-known bank debacles during the subprime crisis. We organise 
them by size. First we consider IndyMac, a small bank that failed on 11 July, 2008, and grabbed 
the headlines because, at the time, it was the fourth largest bank default in the United States. 
We can see that the average rankings of S measures in the quarters before the bank demise are 
                                                 
may not be as synchronised as in the US, which may loosen their connection with systemic measures computed 
at a specific point in time. Second, European stocks may have partially been affected by news from the US market 
rather than real systemic events. In other words, the “US-sneezes-and-the-rest-of-the-world-catches-a-cold” 
scenario may negatively impact on the predictive power of European market-based systemic measures. 
23 Our definition of bank failure is in line with Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2016) and Jin, Kanagaretnam 
and Lobo (2011).  
25 
 
consistently lower (denoting higher systemic risk) than the average NS rankings. One may 
argue that this is not surprising as the relatively small size of the bank did not warrant its 
inclusion among the most systemic ones. However, the same result is also found for Northern 
Rock, a medium sized bank whose failure posed an important systemic threat to the UK 
banking sector; and Washington Mutual, an equivalently high profile default in the US. More 
surprisingly, we also observe that S measures consistently indicate higher systemic risk (i.e. 
lower ranking) for very large banks (assets above $500bn) in the last available quarter when 
systemic risk could be measured before their collapse. These are Wachovia in the US and 
HBOS in the UK. These results suggest that standardization, as formulated in this study, may 
yield superior early warning indicators of systemic risk for small as well as large institutions. 
To check whether the above anecdotal evidence has more general validity we test the 
performance of NS and S measures when predicting the probability of bank failures, occurred 
during the sub-prime crisis period (2008Q2 to 2009Q1) . Results are presented in Table 6. In 
the US, when systemic risk measures are computed before the crisis, neither group of indicators 
exhibits strong statistical significance (see Panel A). 𝐸𝑆 is the only measure that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level with the expected sign. 𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅, when controlling for bank size, 
is also significant but has a counter-intuitive negative sign, and is accompanied by a highly 
significant size coefficient. This is the result of a puzzling interaction between the two variables, 
neither of which is significant in univariate regressions. When size is orthogonalised with 
respect to 𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅, the significance of 𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 disappears.  
With systemic risk measures computed at the beginning of the crisis in 2008Q1, the 
univariate analysis in the US sample reveals that all S measures are statistically significant at 
the 5% or 1% level. For NS measures only 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅  and 𝐸𝑆  are significant. The higher 
consistency of forecasting ability among S measures suggests that they are more dependable 
predictors. Bank size is statistically significant both alone and in all cases when combined with 
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NS and S measures, except for 𝐸𝑆. This suggests that size effects beyond those reflected in NS 
and S measures are indeed helpful to predict US bank failures.  
In the European sample, the predictive power of systemic risk measures declines relative to 
the US sample. However, it is only S measures that have some statistical significance: 𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 
when computed in the pre-crisis period and 𝑠𝑆𝑌𝑅 when computed at the beginning of the crisis. 
Size does not play any noticeable role. 
  
4.3.3. Bank bailouts 
Another way to determine the relative accuracy of NS and S measures against realised systemic 
risk is by testing if they can predict bank bailouts. Following Zhang et al (2015) we have 
matched our US and European samples against government capital injections from ProPublica 
for US banks and Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) for European banks. Only 9 US banks that were 
forced to enter the Capital Purchase Program24 are considered to have been bailed-out for the 
purpose of this analysis, while all those that entered the program voluntarily are left out. Our 
findings in Table 7 suggest that for the US, NS measures are strongly significant while S 
measures are not. This suggests that bank size is the primary driver of bailout decisions. Figure 
6 shows the strong relationship between bailout amount and bank size. The implication is that 
the US government paid little attention to the non-size related systemic risk factors and were 
mostly motivated in its interventions by too-big-to-fail considerations. Indeed, when size is 
added as a control it is almost invariably highly significant for both NS and S measures. Further, 
the explanatory power of multivariate regressions for each NS measure and its S counterpart is 
very similar, again revealing the common influence of size effects. The significance of size 
when combined with NS measures is plausible because, even though those measures may be 
                                                 
24 The Capital Purchase Programme was part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program that was signed into law 
on October 3, 2008. 
27 
 
mostly driven by size, they are also influenced by other factors. Hence, a pure indicator of size 
may add explanatory power as it is unhampered by confounding factors. When we run similar 
regressions but with NS measures orthogonalised with respect to size to eliminate any size 
effects from them, the measures become, in most cases, insignificant (see Appendix 4). This 
again lends support to our conclusion about the size motivated actions taken by the US. When 
we look at Europe in Table 8 Panel B and Appendix 4 Panel B our conclusions are, by and 
large, confirmed.  
 
4.4 Policy implications 
While devising a methodology to detect globally systemic important banks (G-SIBs), the Basel 
Committee, which represents bank regulators and supervisory authorities from 28 jurisdictions, 
has rejected existing systemic risk measures in the literature. The rationale was that 
“quantitative models to estimate individual banks’ contributions to systemic risk … are at a 
very early stage of development and concerns remain about the robustness of the results. The 
models may not capture all the ways that a bank is systemically important” (BCBS, 2013). S-
measures could provide a bridge towards a more comprehensive assessment of systemic risk. 
An advantage of these measures is that they are based on existing ones and can be easily 
computed and interpreted. Their out of sample ability to predict bank distress during recent 
crises, as documented in this study, indicates that S-measures can provide a fuller picture of 
systemic risk when combined with NS measures. Further, G-SIBs are currently designated by 
the Basel Committee on the basis of banks’ balance sheet data that do not exploit banks’ stock 
price information. 25  Then, the refinement of market-based measures would also help to 
                                                 
25 See Table 1 in BCBS (2013) “Global systemically important banks: updated assessment methodology and 
the higher loss absorbency requirement” for a list of balance sheet items employed by the Basel Committee to 
build a bank specific systemic risk score. 
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increase regulators’ confidence in these indicators. This could broaden and improve the 
information set currently used to identify G-SIBs.  
The Table below illustrates how systemic risk assessment could be improved by combining NS 
and S measures. For simplicity we identify 4 scenarios produced by possible combinations of 
high (H) or low (L) systemic risk for the same institution according to different indicators. 
When both types of measure are consistent with one another the interpretation is 
straightforward in the sense that systemic risk may (H, H) or may not (L, L) be an issue for that 
institution. However, when the NS and S average rankings are discordant, then further analysis 
may be needed to arrive at a final conclusion. An indication of high risk from an NS measure 
may be overshadowed by size effects and hence could be dismissed if the corresponding S 
indicator points in the opposition direction. Additional capital may still be required of this 
institution, as a precautionary measure. By contrast, a low average NS measure may under-
estimate the risk posed by smaller but risky and highly interconnected entities (with high S 
ranking). In this case too, a regulatory capital add-on for systemic risk may be applied. 
 
 Systemic risk scenarios 
 1 2 3 4 
Average NS H H L L 
Average S H L H L 
Systemic risk H ? ? L 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we propose ways to improve the assessment of systemic risk in the financial 
system. As a testing ground we consider the period 2004-2012 that includes both the subprime 
crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis which have characterised the longest and deepest 
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recession since the Great Depression. We put forward a new hybrid systemic risk indicator, 
𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅, that combines a well-established structural model of default risk with the concept of 
conditional capital shortfall. We find that 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅-based ranking successfully identifies US and 
European institutions that have been designated as systemically important by the Financial 
Stability Board.  
Further, we propose a new standardisation procedure that enables us to control for the 
overshadowing effect of bank size. We show that when popular systemic risk indicators (e.g. 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 , ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 , and 𝐸𝑆) as well as 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅  are standardised, their ability to predict bank 
distress may markedly improve. We argue that regulators could draw more accurate insights 
into the multidimensional nature of systemic risk by combining traditional and standardised 
indicators. More generally, this combination could increase regulators’ confidence in market-
based measures which are currently excluded from official scoring models of systemic risk. 
Moreover, we observe that the capital injections in the 2011 Capital Purchase Program of 
the US government and those sponsored by European governments are mainly allocated on the 
basis of bank size and do not appear to be affected by other factors that may influence systemic 
risk. This may be a cause for concern, as such factors may have played an important role in 
relatively smaller bank failures that had major systemic consequences. In contrast, large banks 
that are well capitalised and have low risk may not necessarily be systemic.  
While our research focuses on banks, it could be easily extended to other financial 
institutions, such as insurance companies, to gain a broader understanding of systemic risk in 
the financial industry. Moreover, our findings could be used to challenge the conventional 
association between systemic risk and bank size. As our standardised indicator can help detect 
systemic risk stemming from smaller banks, it is well suited to complement existing measures 
to determine how much additional capital or financial penalties (e.g. in the form of a Pigouvian 
tax) systemically important banks should be charged. 
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Figure 1. Overall systemic risk in the US and European banking systems. This figure plots 
the estimated systemic risk in the US and European banking systems. Systemic risk is measured 
as the probability (%) that the assets of the banks in distress exceed 10% of total bank assets 
over the next six months. 
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Figure 2.  Average rank correlations. This figure reports for each systemic risk indicator in the non-standardised (NS) and standardised (S) 
groups, the average rank correlation between the indicator and the others within that group over the whole sample period December 2003 - 
December 2012. We also report averages per group. Correlations are calculated for the whole sample and for a subsample consists of only the top 
30 institutions by asset size in each region.  
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Figure 3.  Average rank correlations (pre-crisis vs. crisis). This figure reports for each systemic risk indicator in the non-standardised (NS) and 
standardised (S) groups, the average rank correlation between the indicator and the others within that group over the pre-crisis period December 
2003 - May 2007 and over the crisis period June 2007 - December 2012, respectively. We also report averages per group.  
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Figure 4.  Systemic risk indicators and size. This figure reports for each systemic risk 
indicator in the non-standardised (NS) and standardised (S) groups, its average rank correlation 
with bank size over the whole sample period December 2003 - December 2012. We also report 
averages per group.  
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A. Bank with total assets below US$50 billion 
 
B. Banks with total assets between US$50 billion and US$500 billion 
     
 
C. Banks with total assets above US$500 billion 
   
 
Figure 5. Average systemic risk rankings five quarters before the bailout/demise. This 
figure shows average systemic risk rankings for IndyMac, Washington Mutual, Northern Rock, 
Wachovia and HBOS. The averages are calculated across all non-standardized measures (rSYR, 
SRISK, ΔCoVaR and ES) and all standardized measures (sSYR, sSRISK, sΔCoVaR and sES). 
The rankings for IndyMac, a small bank with total assets less than US$50 billion in December 
2006, are relative to all US banks in our sample. The rankings for Washington Mutual and 
Wachovia (Northern Rock and HBOS), which are large banks with total assets in excess of 
US$50 billion in December 2006, are relative to all large US (European) banks in our sample. 
For each bank, we report the rankings over the last five available quarters before the failure of 
the bank. 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Bank level relationship between US government capital injections and bank size. 
This figure presents the scatterplot of the relative dollar amounts committed by the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP) against bank size measured by total assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 1. Rank correlations of systemic risk measures 
Panel A of this Table reports the averages of pairwise rank correlations among the eight systemic risk measures studied in the paper, and bank size 
measured as total assets, during the whole sample period December 2003-December 2012. Rank correlations for the US (European) samples are 
reported on the upper (lower) triangular matrix. See Appendix 2 for detailed definitions of the systemic risk variables. Panel B shows the average 
values of the Herfindahl index and its normalised values for the US and European banking sectors. 
 
Panel A: Pairwise correlation 
 rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES Size 
rSYR  0.52 0.22 0.36 0.47 0.27 0.10 0.23 0.94 
SRISK 0.90  0.05 0.47 0.49 0.85 -0.01 0.40 0.47 
ΔCoVaR 0.40 0.35  -0.10 -0.03 -0.06 0.90 -0.15 0.23 
ES 0.71 0.71 0.24  0.49 0.49 -0.14 0.98 0.30 
sSYR 0.50 0.59 0.05 0.51  0.57 -0.06 0.47 0.26 
sSRISK 0.49 0.69 0.15 0.49 0.73  -0.07 0.47 0.18 
sΔCoVaR 0.32 0.29 0.95 0.18 0.05 0.18  -0.17 0.10 
sES 0.50 0.52 0.13 0.93 0.48 0.44 0.08  0.16 
Size 0.99 0.89 0.41 0.70 0.46 0.48 0.33 0.48  
Panel B: Size Herfindahl Index 
 US banks European banks  
 Herfindahl Index Normalised Herfindahl Index Herfindahl Index Normalised Herfindahl Index  
 0.076 0.063 0.045 0.027  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of banks’ characteristics 
 
This Table shows summary statistics (panel A) and pairwise correlations among independent 
variables (panel B) for the banks in our sample. In panel B, pairwise correlations for US 
(European) banks are reported on the upper (lower) triangular matrix. Assets growth is the 
quarterly return of a bank’s total assets; Tier 1 ratio is the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk weighted 
assets; Leverage is computed as total assets over total common equity; Asset Liquidity is the 
sum of available-for-sale securities and held-to-maturity securities over total assets, as in 
Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2016); Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated as net income 
divided by total assets; the Deposit Ratio is deposits over total assets. Sample period: 2003Q4 
to 2012Q4. All variables are winsorised at 5% and 95%.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 US Sample 
  Total Assets  (bn USD) 
Assets 
Growth 
(%) 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
(%) 
Leverage 
Asset 
Liquidity 
(%) 
ROA (%) Deposit Ratio  (%) 
Mean 87.02 1.38 10.51 11.59 22.13 0.81 67.42 
Median 25.04 1.01 10.24 11.02 19.74 1.02 67.99 
Max 612.40 9.30 15.60 18.04 46.09 1.84 83.61 
Min 9.60 -4.33 7.03 7.74 8.19 -1.54 45.57 
Std. Dev. 146.70 3.38 2.38 2.68 10.37 0.83 10.30 
Skewness 2.70 0.59 0.47 0.87 0.89 -1.45 -0.42 
Kurtosis 9.51 3.05 2.37 3.15 2.99 4.77 2.54 
Obs. 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
  European Sample 
 Total Assets  (bn USD) 
Assets 
Growth 
(%) 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
(%) 
Leverage 
Asset 
Liquidity 
(%) 
ROA (%) Deposit Ratio  (%) 
Mean 763.67 1.48 9.85 25.46 28.13 0.42 40.32 
Median 435.07 1.10 9.20 23.09 26.33 0.47 39.58 
Max 2,558.15 11.76 16.36 49.61 52.21 1.21 66.39 
Min 40.05 -6.29 6.50 12.41 8.20 -0.73 19.73 
Std. Dev. 775.93 4.45 2.64 10.22 13.32 0.47 13.91 
Skewness 1.06 0.46 0.97 0.88 0.31 -0.63 0.24 
Kurtosis 2.97 2.97 3.20 2.96 1.98 3.37 1.92 
Obs. 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 
 Panel B: Pairwise correlations among independent variables 
 
Log 
(Total 
Assets) 
Assets 
Growth 
Tier1 
Ratio Leverage 
Asset 
Liquidity ROA Deposit Ratio 
Log (Total assets)  0.02 -0.18 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 -0.37 
Assets Growth -0.02  -0.05 0.06 0.15 0.27 -0.10 
Tier1 Ratio 0.19 -0.10  -0.13 0.35 -0.05 0.34 
Leverage 0.41 -0.01 -0.01  0.15 -0.21 -0.20 
Asset Liquidity 0.52 -0.04 0.25 0.37  0.19 -0.21 
ROA -0.20 0.24 -0.13 -0.24 -0.25  -0.01 
Deposit Ratio -0.38 0.04 -0.09 -0.43 -0.22 0.29  
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Table 3. Determinants of systemic risk measures 
In this Table, we show results of panel regressions of bank specific systemic risk measures on (1 quarter) lagged bank characteristics. We employ 
8 indicators of systemic risk. ES and sES are log-transformed by 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑆 + 1) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝐸𝑆 ∗ 1000,000 + 1), respectively. Explanatory variables 
include Size measured as log of total assets; Assets Growth given by the quarterly return of total assets; Tier1 ratio which is the ratio of tier1 capital 
to risk weighted assets; Leverage computed as total assets over total common equity; Liquidity equal to the sum of available for sale securities and 
held to maturity securities over total assets, as in Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2016); Return on Assets (ROA) calculated as net income divided 
by total assets; and Deposit Ratio which is deposits over total assets. LC is a dummy that equals 1 if a bank’s tier 1 ratio is less than 10%. Sample 
period: 2003Q4 to 2012Q4. Variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
t-values have been computed with White period (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust) standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
 
Panel A: US Banks Non-standardized Standardized 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Constant -5.711*** -1.024*** 2.213*** -2.622 46.343*** -9.372** 2.559*** 0.239 
Size 0.648*** 0.121*** 0.066*** 0.358*** 1.530* 0.330 0.022 0.168 
Assets Growth 0.001 -0.002 0.023** -0.041** -0.747*** -0.014 0.018** -0.081*** 
Assets Growth2 -0.001 0.000 -0.003** 0.009*** 0.123*** -0.004 -0.002** 0.017*** 
Tier 1 ratio -0.031 0.003 -0.035** 0.119 0.039 0.231* -0.031** 0.273** 
LC -0.674 -0.072 -0.233 1.017 20.192 8.228*** 0.002 3.624* 
Tier 1 ratio*LC 0.057 -0.001 0.027 -0.079 -2.190 -0.858*** 0.003 -0.319 
Leverage 0.022 0.008* -0.027** 0.015 1.274*** 0.535*** -0.027** 0.061 
Liquidity 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.036 -0.021 -0.001 -0.016 
ROA -0.118 -0.273*** 0.058 -3.280*** -14.497*** -8.902*** -0.181 -5.609*** 
Deposit Ratio -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.018 -0.210* -0.038 0.001 -0.040** 
         
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.689 0.507 0.880 0.346 0.169 0.767 0.885 0.359 
Adjusted R-squared with only FEs -0.017 0.185 0.872 0.142 0.020 0.568 0.880 0.175 
Adjusted R-squared with only Size 0.659 0.301 0.020 0.077 0.022 0.024 0.010 0.013 
Observations 1,837 
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Panel B: European Banks Non-standardized Standardized 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Constant -18.224*** -17.423*** 0.915 -13.072*** 57.703*** 1.824 1.658*** -2.771 
Size 1.578*** 1.535*** 0.184*** 1.312*** 1.323* 0.353*** 0.133*** 0.516** 
Assets Growth -0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.065*** -0.146 -0.039*** -0.004 -0.063** 
Assets Growth2 0.005** 0.003 -0.001 0.014*** 0.015 -0.002 -0.000 0.014*** 
Tier 1 ratio 0.036 -0.002 -0.097*** 0.183** 0.209 -0.245* -0.115*** 0.220** 
LC 0.601 0.334 -0.964** 3.083 1.106 -0.329 -1.168*** 4.362* 
Tier 1 ratio*LC -0.082 -0.064 0.099** -0.364* 0.231 0.034 0.116*** -0.466** 
Leverage 0.026 0.063*** -0.005 0.045* 0.381*** 0.074*** -0.003 0.050* 
Liquidity 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.006 
ROA 0.154 -1.345 0.303 -3.862*** -13.515 -4.194*** 0.072 -4.238*** 
Deposit Ratio -0.005 -0.017 -0.002 -0.025* -0.039 -0.021** -0.002 -0.028* 
         
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.789 0.727 0.754 0.616 0.305 0.716 0.754 0.419 
Adjusted R-squared with only FEs -0.030 -0.027 0.695 0.070 0.018 0.348 0.699 0.138 
Adjusted R-squared with only Size 0.771 0.658 0.049 0.452 0.115 0.155 0.035 0.160 
Observations 1,081 
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Table 4. Prediction of large stock price contractions with pre-crisis systemic risk measures 
This Table reports Probit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank’s stock price fall (F) is larger than 80% or 90% during the 
sub-prime crisis period (2007Q3 to 2009Q1). The dependent variable is always set to 1 for defaulted and delisted banks. Eight systemic risk 
measures (SRM), all lagged and measured in 2007Q2, are used as predictors. ES and sES are log-transformed by 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑆 + 1) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝐸𝑆 ∗
1,000,000 + 1), respectively. Size is computed as log of total assets in 2007Q2. In the multivariate specifications involving non-standardised 
systemic risk measures, the component of Size that is orthogonal to systemic risk, instead of the Size itself, is used. Panel A (B) shows results for 
the US (Europe).  Detailed definitions of the systemic risk measures are shown in Appendix 2.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. t-values have been computed with White (heteroscedasticity) standard errors. For specifications with significant systemic risk 
measure, the percentage of correctly classified banks is also reported, with the cup-off point being the ratio between the number of distressed banks 
and the total number of observations. 
Panel A: US Banks Dependent variable: =1 if fall in stock price > F, 0 otherwise 
 F=80% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 7.00 4.23 -15.60 0.23**  6.77 4.22 -16.23 0.23*** 
Size     0.14 0.11 0.11 0.24** 0.08 
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.013 0.001 0.072 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.038 0.077 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - - - 37.5%  - - - 40.0% 
% All banks correctly classified - - - 62.8%  - - - 61.5% 
   
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 5.07*** 32.89*** -6.07 0.15**  4.92*** 30.72*** -58.50 0.14** 
Size     0.14 0.05 0.10 0.18* 0.12 
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.086 0.000 0.070 0.019 0.159 0.095 0.026 0.085 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 75.0% 35.0% - 42.5%  75.0% 40.0% - 52.5% 
% All banks correctly classified 70.5% 61.5% - 64.1%  70.5% 62.8% - 65.4% 
No of Obs. 78 
No of distressed banks 40 
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Table 4 – Panel A - continued F=90% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 7.26 6.99* -62.18 0.17**  7.21 6.98 -70.16 0.17** 
Size     0.12 0.04 0.02 0.32** 0.07 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.037 0.012 0.048 0.015 0.018 0.037 0.074 0.053 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - 17.2% - 41.4%  - - - 41.4% 
% All banks correctly classified - 66.7% - 69.2%  - - - 64.1% 
   
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 5.93*** 35.99*** -35.94 0.09*  5.83*** 34.65*** -92.39 0.09* 
Size     0.12 0.04 0.08 0.19* 0.11 
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.124 0.004 0.035 0.015 0.176 0.131 0.033 0.047 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 75.9% 41.4% - 41.4%  75.9% 44.8% - 51.7% 
% All banks correctly classified 71.8% 71.8% - 65.4%  71.8% 71.8% - 64.1% 
No of Obs. 78 
No of distressed banks 29 
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Table 4 - continued 
Panel B: European Banks 
Dependent variable: =1 if fall in stock price > F, 0 otherwise 
F=80% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 3.77 3.71 24.24 0.03  3.91 3.76 24.61 0.04 
Size     0.12 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.11 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.014 0.014 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 4.12* 22.17** 30.81 0.04  4.39 22.58** 2.73 0.03 
Size     0.12 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.09 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.089 0.004 0.011 0.014 0.060 0.089 0.014 0.017 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 80.0% 65.0% - -  - 65.0% - - 
% All banks correctly classified 61.1% 66.7% - -  - 66.7% - - 
No of Obs. 54 
No of distressed banks 20 
 F=90% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM -1.15 -0.63 -23.85 0.01  -1.18 -0.65 -23.46 0.01 
Size     -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.03 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.002 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 3.92 18.05** -28.86 0.03  5.41 21.15** -36.89 0.03 
Size     -0.00 -0.17 -0.11 0.03 -0.04 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.063 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.069 0.074 0.005 0.007 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - 63.6% - -  - 72.7% - - 
% All banks correctly classified - 61.1% - -  - 68.5% - - 
No of Obs. 54 
No of distressed banks 11 
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Table 5. Prediction of large stock price contractions with in-crisis systemic risk measures 
This Table reports Probit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank’s stock price fall (F) is larger than 80% or 90% during the 
sub-prime crisis period (2008Q2 to 2009Q1). The dependent variable is always set to 1 for defaulted and delisted banks. Eight systemic risk 
measures (SRM), all lagged and measured in 2008Q1, are used as predictors. ES and sES are log-transformed by 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑆 + 1) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝐸𝑆 ∗
1,000,000 + 1), respectively.  Size is computed as log of total assets in 2008Q1. In the multivariate specifications involving non-standardised 
systemic risk measures, the component of Size that is orthogonal to systemic risk, instead of the Size itself, is used. Panel A (B) shows results for 
the US (Europe).  Detailed definitions of the systemic risk measures are shown in Appendix 2.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. t-values have been computed with White (heteroscedasticity) standard errors. For specifications with significant systemic risk 
measure, the percentage of correctly classified banks is also reported, with the cup-off point being the ratio between the number of distressed banks 
and the total number of observations. 
Panel A: US Banks Dependent variable: =1 if fall in stock price > F, 0 otherwise 
 F=80% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 13.49** 17.40*** 23.99* 0.28***  13.30** 18.36*** 19.98** 0.28*** 
Size     0.22** 0.09 -0.12 0.14 -0.04 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.125 0.077 0.304 0.064 0.075 0.130 0.095 0.305 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 44.4% 50.0% 44.4% 77.8%  55.6% 44.4% 55.6% 77.8% 
% All banks correctly classified 79.7% 82.4% 59.5% 79.7%  74.3% 81.1% 68.9% 78.4% 
   
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 5.39*** 34.83*** 27.25* 0.21***  5.13*** 33.10*** 19.51* 0.20*** 
Size     0.22** 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.17 
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.301 0.093 0.264 0.064 0.246 0.308 0.109 0.292 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 72.2% 88.9% 61.1% 88.9%  77.8% 83.3% 55.6% 83.3% 
% All banks correctly classified 67.6% 77.0% 63.5% 75.7%  73.0% 74.3% 68.9% 75.7% 
No of Obs. 74 
No of distressed banks 18 
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Table 5 – Panel A – continued 
 
F=90% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 8.45 11.24* 31.44** 0.27***  9.15* 11.79** 24.93** 0.27*** 
Size     0.27** 0.44** 0.24 0.17 0.03 
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.067 0.114 0.291 0.092 0.109 0.093 0.139 0.292 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - 53.3% 46.7% 80.0%  73.3% 66.7% 60.0% 80.0% 
% All banks correctly classified - 83.8% 64.9% 78.4%  66.2% 73.0% 71.6% 79.7% 
   
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 5.92*** 46.58*** 35.06** 0.21***  5.75*** 44.57*** 24.13* 0.20*** 
Size     0.27** 0.23** 0.15 0.16 0.22* 
Pseudo R2 0.233 0.393 0.133 0.259 0.092 0.294 0.413 0.155 0.309 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 80.0% 93.3% 60.0% 93.3%  86.7% 86.7% 60.0% 80.0% 
% All banks correctly classified 73.0% 81.1% 64.9% 75.7%  74.3% 79.7% 73.0% 74.3% 
No of Obs. 74 
No of distressed banks 15 
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Table 5 - continued Dependent variable: =1 if fall in stock price > F, 0 otherwise 
Panel B: European Banks F=80% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 1.19 -1.66 21.98 0.03  0.75 -2.45 24.76 0.04 
Size     0.16 0.60** 0.49** 0.11 0.16 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.001 0.020 0.006 0.023 0.071 0.079 0.028 0.023 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 7.99** 12.56 29.71 0.02  8.24** 10.51 23.30 0.01 
Size     0.16 -0.03 0.08 0.09 0.15 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.040 0.033 0.003 0.023 0.126 0.045 0.038 0.023 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 75.0% - - -  75.0% - - - 
% All banks correctly classified 62.0% - - -  62.0% - - - 
No of Obs. 50 
No of distressed banks 8 
 F=90% 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM -3.46 -6.80 6.73 0.08  -6.79 -10.92 8.58 0.08 
Size     0.07 0.52* 0.43 0.06 -0.07 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.014 0.002 0.035 0.004 0.056 0.076 0.005 0.038 
% Distressed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 7.97** 11.49 12.00 0.09  9.34* 11.93 9.38 0.09 
Size     0.07 -0.14 -0.02 0.04 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.036 0.006 0.045 0.004 0.134 0.036 0.007 0.045 
% Distressed banks correctly classified 66.7% - - -  66.7% - - - 
% All banks correctly classified 58.0% - - -  54.0% - - - 
No of Obs. 50 
No of distressed banks 6 
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Table 6. Prediction of bank failures  
This Table reports Probit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 for defaulted and delisted banks during the sub-prime crisis period 
(2008Q2 to 2009Q1). Eight systemic risk measures (SRM) are variables of interest and are used as predictors. ES and sES are log-transformed by 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑆 + 1) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝐸𝑆 ∗ 1,000,000 + 1), respectively. Size is computed as log of total assets. In the multivariate specifications involving non-
standardised systemic risk measures, the component of Size that is orthogonal to systemic risk, instead of the Size itself, is used. Independent 
variables are lagged and measured in 2007Q2 and 2008Q1, respectively. Panel A (B) shows results for the US (Europe). Detailed definitions of 
the systemic risk measures are shown in Appendix 2.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. t-values have been computed 
with White (heteroscedasticity) standard errors. For specifications with significant systemic risk measure, the percentage of correctly classified 
banks is also reported, with the cup-off point being the ratio between the number of distressed banks and the total number of observations. 
Panel A: US Banks   
 Independent variables measured in 2007Q2 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 2.87 4.49 -50.39 0.14*  2.15 4.68 -64.26 0.14* 
Size     0.17 0.44** 0.14 0.48*** 0.12 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.022 0.011 0.048 0.036 0.071 0.039 0.140 0.063 
% Failed banks correctly classified - - - 36.4%  - - - 45.5% 
% All banks correctly classified - - - 71.8%  - - - 68.0% 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 1.21 2.22 -64.09 0.06  0.78 -1.37 -179.75* 0.05 
Size      0.15 0.18* 0.35*** 0.16 
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.001 0.016 0.015  0.042 0.037 0.113 0.045 
% Failed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - 63.6% - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - 69.2% - 
No of Obs. 78 
No of distressed banks 11 
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Table 6 – Panel A - continued Independent variables measured in 2008Q1 
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 7.47 8.23 39.94** 0.23***  11.34 11.37* 34.85** 0.23*** 
Size     0.34*** 0.86*** 0.62*** 0.19* 0.13 
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.041 0.244 0.256 0.143 0.226 0.180 0.274 0.268 
% Failed banks correctly classified - - 57.1% 85.7%  - 85.7% 57.1% 85.7% 
% All banks correctly classified - - 77.0% 75.7%  - 71.6% 74.3% 78.4% 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 3.59** 22.12*** 40.12** 0.15**  3.48* 17.74** 29.83** 0.13* 
Size      0.29*** 0.25** 0.20** 0.27*** 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.145 0.255 0.162  0.226 0.213 0.290 0.247 
% Failed banks correctly classified 85.7% 85.7% 57.1% 85.7%  85.7% 85.7% 57.1% 85.7% 
% All banks correctly classified 66.2% 68.9% 79.7% 64.9%  73.0% 75.7% 75.7% 74.3% 
No of Obs. 74 
No of distressed banks 7 
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Table 6 - continued Independent variables measured in 2007Q2 
Panel B: European Banks rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 0.38 0.54 -40.72 0.03  0.40 0.57 -40.17 0.03 
Size     -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.009 
% Failed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 3.69 21.07** -49.00 0.05  5.01 24.42** -64.50 0.06 
Size      -0.15 -0.13 0.07 -0.06 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.086 0.011 0.016  0.062 0.098 0.014 0.019 
% Failed banks correctly classified - 70.0% - -  - 70.0% - - 
% All banks correctly classified - 64.8% - -  - 70.4% - - 
No of Obs. 54 
No of distressed banks 10 
 Independent variables measured in 2008Q1 
          
 rSYR SRSIK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM -0.96 -5.05 0.24 0.09  -2.57 -7.98 4.04 0.09 
Size     0.09 0.43 0.41 0.11 -0.05 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.047 0.007 0.041 0.069 0.009 0.048 
% Failed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
          
 sSYR sSRSIK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 10.69* 10.97 8.21 0.09  11.87 10.63 3.60 0.09 
Size      -0.13 0.02 0.08 0.03 
Pseudo R2 0.165 0.034 0.003 0.051  0.175 0.035 0.008 0.052 
% Failed banks correctly classified 80.0% - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified 62.0% - - -  - - - - 
No of Obs. 50 
No of distressed banks 5 
55 
 
 
 
Table 7. Relationship between bailouts and banks’ systemic risk 
This Table reports Probit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank was bailed out during the crisis. Size, expressed as log of 
total assets, and eight systemic risk measures (SRM), all computed in 2007Q2, are used as predictors. ES and sES are log-transformed by 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑆 +
1)  and 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝐸𝑆 ∗ 1,000,000 + 1) , respectively. In the multivariate specifications involving non-standardised systemic risk measures, the 
component of Size that is orthogonal to systemic risk, instead of the Size itself, is used. Panel A (B) shows results for the US (Europe). Detailed 
definitions of the systemic risk measures are shown in Appendix 2.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. t-values have 
been computed with White (heteroscedasticity) standard errors. For specifications with significant systemic risk measure, the percentage of 
correctly classified banks is also reported, with the cup-off point being the ratio between the number of distressed banks and the total number of 
observations. 
 
Panel A: US banks          
 rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 0.48*** 0.13*** 1.69** 0.16**  0.43*** 0.14*** 1.39** 0.21** 
Size     0.64*** 0.22 0.62*** 0.83*** 0.62*** 
Pseudo R2 0.410 0.138 0.080 0.053 0.376 0.419 0.377 0.404 0.383 
% Failed banks correctly classified 62.5% 31.3% 62.5% 43.8%  62.5% 75.0% 81.3% 81.3% 
% All banks correctly classified 88.5% 83.3% 64.1% 74.4%  84.6% 79.5% 83.3% 82.1% 
          
 sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 0.01 0.11 1.02 0.07  -0.01 0.04 -1.34 0.09 
Size     0.64*** 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.76*** 0.66*** 
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.016 0.029 0.022 0.376 0.384 0.378 0.401 0.399 
% Failed banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
% All banks correctly classified - - - -  - - - - 
No of Obs. 78 
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Table 7 – continued 
 
Panel B: European banks rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES  rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 0.28*** 0.14* 1.24** 0.04  0.30*** 0.17*** 1.29** 0.06 
Size     0.52*** 0.40 0.52** 0.54*** 0.79*** 
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.102 0.069 0.012 0.206 0.209 0.206 0.206 0.267 
% Failed banks correctly classified 64.7% 52.9% 82.4% -  70.6% 70.6% 70.6% - 
% All banks correctly classified 75.9% 75.9% 70.4% -  72..2% 70.4% 70.4% - 
          
          
 sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES  sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Standardised SRM 0.05 0.09 1.24** 0.01  -0.00 -0.13 0.06 -0.12* 
Size     0.52*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.52*** 0.70*** 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.014 0.054 0.001 0.206 0.206 0.222 0.206 0.259 
% Failed banks correctly classified - -  -  - - - 88.2% 
% All banks correctly classified - -  -  - - - 79.6% 
No of Obs. 54 
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Appendix 1: Bank list 
The table contains firm level information for all the financial firms in our sample. We report 
the book value of total assets just before the sub-prime crisis (December 2006) and at the end 
of the sample period (December 2012). Banks are labelled with a “Y” if they are identified as 
systemically important financial firms (SIFIs) in 2011 by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). 
For US banks, a “Y” in the last column of Panel A indicates participation in the US Treasury’s 
Capital Purchase Program (CPP) in 2008. Firms with an asterisk defaulted or were acquired 
during our sample period. 
 
Panel A: United States 
Bank Name Bank Total Assets (bn USD) SIFIs (2011) CPP (2008) 
 Dec-06 Dec-12   
Citigroup 1,884 1,865 Y Y 
Bank of America 1,460 2,210 Y Y 
JPMorgan Chase 1,352 2359 Y Y 
Morgan Stanley 1,121 781 Y Y 
Fannie Mae 844 3,222   
Merrill Lynch 841 603   
Goldman Sachs  838 939 Y Y 
Freddie Mac 813 1,990   
Wachovia* 707 --   
Lehman Brothers* 504 --   
Wells Fargo & Co 482 1,423 Y Y 
Bear Stearns* 350 --   
Washington Mutual* 346 --   
US Bancorp 219 354  Y 
Countrywide Financial* 200 --   
Suntrust banks 182 173  Y 
Regions Financial 143 121  Y 
National City Corp* 140 --   
BB&T 121 184  Y 
State Street Corp 107 223 Y Y 
Bank NY Mellon 103 359 Y Y 
PNC Financial 102 305  Y 
Fifth Third Banc 101 122  Y 
Keycorp 92 89  Y 
Santander Holding USA 90 86   
Northern Trust 61 97  Y 
Comerica Inc 58 65  Y 
M&T Bank Corp 57 83  Y 
Marshall & Ilsley Corp* 56 --  Y 
E Trade Financial Corp 54 47   
MUFG Americas Holdings 53 97   
Schwab (Charles) Corp 49 134   
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Panel A continued 
Popular Inc 47 37   
Zions Bancorp 47 56  Y 
Commerce Banc NJ* 45 --   
Mellon Financial Corp* 41 --   
TD Banknorth Inc* 40 --   
First Horizon NA 38 26  Y 
Hudson City Bncp 36 41   
Huntington Banc 35 56  Y 
BBVA Compass Bancshares 34 69   
Synovus Finl 32 27  Y 
Indymac Bancorp* 29 --   
NY Comm Bancorp 28 44   
Impac Mortgage Holdings 24 6   
Colonial Bancgro* 23 --   
Astoria Finl 22 16   
Assoc Banc-corp 21 23  Y 
Blackrock Inc 20 200   
Jefferies Group Llc 18 36   
Sky Financial Group Inc* 18 --   
Mercantile Bankshares Corp* 18 --   
First Bancorp 17 13  Y 
TD Ameritrade Holding Corp 17 21   
W Holding* 17 --   
Webster Finl 17 20  Y 
Downey Finl Corp* 16 --   
First Citizens-A 16 21  Y 
Flagstar Bancorp 15 14  Y 
Commerce Bcshs 15 22   
Fulton Financial 15 17  Y 
City Natl Corp 15 29  Y 
TCF Finl Corp 15 18  Y 
South Financial* 14 --  Y 
Citizens Republic 14 10  Y 
Bankunited Fin-A* 14 --   
Arlington Asset Investment 13 2   
Cullen/Frost 13 23   
Valley Natl Banc 12 16  Y 
Raymond James Financial 12 22   
Bancorpsouth Inc 12 13   
Doral Financial Corp 12 8   
First Republic 12 34   
Investors Financial*  12 --   
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Panel A continued 
Wilmington Trust Corp* 11 --  Y 
Maf Bancorp Inc* 11 --   
Intl Bancshares Corp 11 12   
East West Bancorp Inc 11 23   
People’s United 11 30   
Bank of Hawaii Corp 11 14   
Firstmerit Corp 10 15  Y 
Whitney Holding Corp* 10 --  Y 
Corus Bankshares Inc* 10 --   
Panel B: Europe     
Bank Name Bank Total Asset (bn USD) SIFIs (2011) 
Dec-06 Dec-12 
UBS 1,963 1,375 Y 
Barclays Plc 1,950 2,410 Y 
BNP Paribas 1,899 2,514 Y 
HSBC  1,860 2,692 Y 
RBS 1,705 2,121 Y 
ING Group  1,617 1,532 Y 
Deutsche Bank-RG 1,485 2,653 Y 
ABN-AMRO Holdings* 1,301 --  
Societe Generale 1,262 1,649 Y 
HBOS Plc* 1,156 --  
Banco Santander 1,100 1,674 Y 
Unicredit Spa 1,085 1,222 Y 
Credit Suiss-Reg 1,028 1,010  
Commerzbank 802 838 Y 
Dexia SA 748 471 Y 
Lloyds Banking 672 1,495 Y 
Bayerische Hypo & Vereinsbk* 670 --  
Natixis 605 696  
BBVA 543 841  
Nordea 458 893 Y 
KBC Group 429 339  
Intesa Sanpaolo 385 887  
SEB AB-A 282 377  
CIC 282 311  
Standard Chartered 266 637  
Svenska Han-A 261 367  
Erste Group Bank 240 282  
Allied Irish Bank 210 162  
Swedbank AB-A 198 283  
Northern Rock* 198 --  
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Panel B continued    
Landesbank Berli* 187 --  
Capitalia Spa* 181 --  
Alliance & Leice* 134 --  
Banco Popular 121 208  
Banco Com Port-R 104 119  
Natl Bank Greece 102 138  
Banco BPM Spa 91 174  
Bradford & Bing* 88 --  
Deutsche Boerse AG 86 286  
Banco Espirito-R 78 111  
Mediobanca 70 105  
Banca Popolare Italiana* 62 --  
Bankinter 61 76  
Banca Popolare Di Milano 53 69  
BHW Holding AG* 51 --  
Banco BPI SA 47 59  
Piraeus Bank SA 41 92  
Crcam Paris D’ile France 37 46  
Credito Emiliano Spa 32 41  
Banco Pastor* 32 --  
Emporiki Bank of Greece SA* 30 --  
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise 30 44  
Gam Holding Ltd 29 3  
Banco De Valencia SA 21 29  
Kensington Group Plc* 16 --  
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions26 
Panel A: Systemic risk measures 
rSYR 
Market measure of a financial institution’s systemic risk proposed in this 
paper. It is defined as: 𝑟𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
∑ (𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ǀ 𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡>0)𝑖
 , where 
𝑀𝑎𝑥(0,  𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is firm 𝑖’s total expected capital shortfall conditional on 
a financial crisis and ∑ (𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ǀ 𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 > 0)𝑖   is the total amount of 
expected capital shortfall in the financial system during a crisis. 
SRISK 
Market measure of a financial institution’s systemic risk based on 
Brownlees and Engle (2017). It is defined as: 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
∑ (𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ǀ 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡>0)𝑖
, 
where 𝑀𝑎𝑥(0,  𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡)  is firm 𝑖 ’s total expected capital shortfall 
conditional on a financial crisis and ∑ (𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ǀ 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 > 0)𝑖   is the total 
amount of expected capital shortfall in the financial system during a crisis. 
ΔCoVaR 
Market measure of a financial institution’s systemic risk based on Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2016). It is defined as: ΔCoVaR𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 =
CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 )
− CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡
𝑖 )
, where 
CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 )
  is the 𝑞% 𝑉𝑎𝑅  of the value-weighted 
portfolio of all financial firms in the sample, conditional on firm 𝑖 being 
in distress. The distress condition is represented by the firm’s stock price 
being equal to its q% VaR: 𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 ; CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡
𝑖 )
 
is the 𝑞% 𝑉𝑎𝑅 of the value-weighted portfolio of all financial firms in the 
sample, conditional on firm 𝑖 being in normal conditions. In this paper, we 
set 𝑞% = 5%. 
ES 
Market measure of a financial institution’s systemic risk based on Lehar 
(2005). It is defined as a financial firm’s share of the total volatility of the 
expected shortfall of the system: 𝑬𝑺𝒕 =
𝟏
𝑧𝑡
(𝜮𝒕𝜹𝒕
′) ∗ 𝜹𝒕
′  , where 𝑬𝑺𝒕 is a 
vector of systemic risk contributions (expected shortfalls) of all the 
financial firms in the sample; 𝑧𝑡 is the dollar-volatility of the expected 
shortfall in the banking system at time t; 𝜮𝒕 is the variance-covariance 
matrix of the returns on the financial firms’ asset portfolios at time 𝑡; and 
𝜹𝒕 is the vector of partial derivatives (𝑉𝑡
𝑖 𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝑖
𝜕𝑉𝑡
𝑖), where 𝑉𝑡
𝑖 is the asset value 
of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡
𝑖 is the expected shortfall of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡. In 
the Merton (1977) framework, 𝑆𝑡
𝑖 is given by the value of a put option, 
which is written on firm 𝑖’s assets: 𝑆𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐵𝑡
𝑖𝑁(−𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎√𝑇) − 𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑁(−𝑑𝑡)   
                                                 
26  SRISK and ΔCoVaR are estimated using the Matlab codes obtained from 
http://www.runmycode.org/companion/view/175. Please refer to Benoit et al. (2014) for details. We thank the 
authors for sharing their software. To validate the output of the codes we have checked ΔCoVaR against our own 
estimates on a sample of US and European banks and compared SRISK with estimates available from the New 
York Stern Business School Volatility Institute at https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu. 
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where 𝐵𝑡
𝑖 is the book value of total debts, 𝜎 is asset volatility, 𝑉𝑡
𝑖 is the 
market value of total assets and 𝑑𝑡 =
ln(
𝑉𝑡
𝑖
𝐵𝑡
𝑖 )+
𝜎2
2
𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
. 
A nice property of 𝑬𝑺𝒕 is that the sum of its elements is equal to 𝑧𝑡 . 
Therefore 𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡  represents the contribution of bank 𝑖  to the overall 
volatility in the expected shortfall of the banking system.  
 
sSYR 
Standardized version of rSYR. It is defined as: 𝑠𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 , 
where 𝑀𝑎𝑥(0,  𝑆𝑌𝑅𝑖,𝑡)  is firm 𝑖 ’s total expected capital shortfall 
conditional on a financial crisis at time 𝑡 and 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total asset value 
of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
sSRISK 
Standardized version of SRISK. It is defined as: 𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
, 
where 𝑀𝑎𝑥(0,  𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡)  is firm 𝑖 ’s total expected capital shortfall 
conditional on a financial crisis at time 𝑡 and 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total asset value 
of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
  
sΔCoVaR 
Standardized version of ΔCoVaR. It is defined as: ΔCoVaR𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 =
CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 )
− CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡
𝑖 )
, where 
CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 )
 is the 𝑞% 𝑉𝑎𝑅 of the equally-weighted 
portfolio of all financial firms in the sample, conditional on firm 𝑖 being 
in distress. The distress condition is represented by the firm’s stock price 
being equal to its q% VaR: 𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞,𝑡
𝑖 ; 
CoVaR𝑞
(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡
𝑖 )
 is the 𝑞% 𝑉𝑎𝑅 of the value-weighted 
portfolio of all financial firms in the sample, conditional on firm 𝑖 being 
in normal conditions. In this paper, we set 𝑞% = 5%. 
sES 
Standardized version of ES. It is defined as: 𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
. See above for 
the definition of  𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡. 
Panel B: Systemic risk determinants 
Size Log of total assets measured in millions of US $ for US firms and in 
millions of Euros for European firms 
Assets Growth Quarterly total asset return (%) 
Tier1 Ratio Tier1 capital dividend by total risk weighted assets (%) 
Leverage Total assets over total common equity 
Liquidity The sum of available-for-sale securities and held-to-maturity securities 
over total assets (%), as in Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2016) 
ROA Net income divided by total assets (%) 
Deposit Ratio Bank deposits over total assets (%) 
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Appendix 3: Rankings of systemically important banks 
The Table shows the rankings of systemically important banks in the US (panel A) and Europe (panel B) at year-end 2011 according to eight systemic risk 
measures. A bank is included in the table if it is one of the top 20 riskiest banks as of 2011Q4 according to either rSYR or sSYR. Asset value is measured as of 
2011Q4 and is in billion US Dollars for US banks and in billion Euros for European banks. Banks included in the Financial Stability Board (FSB) list of 
“systemically important financial institutions” are labelled with a “Y”. See Appendix 2 for systemic risk variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: United States 
Asset value 
2011 Systemic Risk Rankings 
FSB 
Bank rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Fannie Mae 3,211 1 1 54 2 2 2 55 12  
Freddie Mac 2,147 2 2 52 4 1 1 53 11  
JPMorgan Chase 2,266 3 4 3 7 12 14 4 14 Y 
Bank of America 2,129 4 3 35 5 6 6 44 10 Y 
Citigroup  1,874 5 5 4 1 8 8 9 8 Y 
Wells Fargo & Co 1,314 6 8 21 35 19 41 37 44 Y 
Goldman Sachs  923 7 6 22 8 9 13 36 18 Y 
Morgan Stanley 750 8 7 1 3 4 5 1 5 Y 
US Bancorp 340 9 54 29 47 24 49 30 47  
Bank NY Mellon 325 10 9 2 17 45 21 2 23 Y 
PNC Financial  271 11 14 36 48 33 42 41 49  
State Street Corp 217 12 12 28 12 39 32 23 15 Y 
BB&T 175 13 13 26 27 20 37 19 35  
Blackrock  180 14 25 23 6 31 45 10 2  
Suntrust banks  177 15 10 9 24 44 17 7 30  
Regions Financial  127 16 11 27 19 35 12 16 24  
Fifth Third Banc 117 17 15 44 45 41 35 46 46  
Northern Trust  100 18 17 32 25 34 36 42 26  
Schwab (Charles) Corp 109 19 27 15 31 43 43 18 36  
Keycorp 89 20 16 46 46 38 31 40 45  
E Trade Financial Corp 48 23 19 40 14 10 15 34 13  
Hudson City Bncp 45 24 24 14 15 15 23 17 16  
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Panel A continued           
Popular Inc 37 27 20 43 11 14 9 27 7  
Jefferies Group Llc 35 28 22 6 9 5 10 6 3  
First Citizens-A 21 31 32 45 22 11 24 32 19  
First Bancorp  13 39 38 53 55 7 22 52 55  
Firstmerit Corp 14 40 45 13 28 18 38 14 21  
Valley Natl Banc 14 41 46 5 50 17 46 11 50  
Flagstar Bancorp  14 42 30 47 13 16 7 45 4  
Citizens Republic 9 46 41 51 54 13 18 50 54  
Impac Mortgage Holdings 6 51 42 55 10 3 3 54 1  
Panel B: Europe 
Asset value 
2011 Systemic Risk Rankings 
FSB 
Bank rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES sSYR sSRISK sΔCoVaR sES 
Deutsche Bank-RG 2,164 1 1 9 2 6 4 13 6 Y 
BNP Paribas 1,965 2 2 4 10 25 16 8 19 Y 
HSBC  1,975 3 6 22 6 33 40 26 15 Y 
Barclays Plc 1,868 4 4 24 3 14 17 24 4 Y 
RBS 1,801 5 3 18 4 7 5 19 5 Y 
ING Group 1,274 6 5 8 11 16 10 10 21 Y 
Banco Santander  1,252 7 10 28 24 30 36 27 37 Y 
Societe Generale  1,181 8 7 11 9 8 6 22 14 Y 
UBS  1,167 9 9 27 7 13 25 28 9 Y 
Lloyds Banking  1,160 10 8 13 1 22 14 21 1 Y 
Unicredit Spa 927 11 11 12 18 12 13 15 25 Y 
Credit Suiss-Reg 863 12 12 15 8 17 23 17 8  
Commerzbank 662 13 13 2 5 5 3 1 2 Y 
Nordea  716 14 14 20 21 35 28 14 26 Y 
Intesa Sanpaolo  639 15 15 10 22 31 21 9 27  
BBVA 598 16 18 30 38 36 39 30 42  
Natixis 508 17 16 16 17 19 15 20 16  
Dexia SA 413 18 17 6 44 3 2 4 44 Y 
Standard Chartered  458 19 26 33 20 39 41 35 18  
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Panel B continued           
KBC Group 285 20 19 7 16 24 7 5 13  
Piraeus Bank SA 233 23 21 39 25 11 24 40 29  
Deutsche Boerse AG 218 24 24 38 12 2 30 38 7  
Natl Bank of Greece 131 28 30 44 28 18 35 44 33  
Banco Com  Port-R 107 30 28 40 33 4 9 36 35  
Banco BPI SA 93 32 31 26 39 9 12 23 38  
CIC 59 35 36 36 29 15 31 37 28  
Bankinter 49 36 34 35 34 1 1 34 30  
Landesbank Berli 43 38 37 17 36 10 8 11 31  
Credito Emiliano Spa 31 40 39 34 31 20 26 33 22  
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Appendix 4. Relationship between bailouts and orthogonalised banks’ non-standardised systemic risk 
This Table reports Probit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank was bailed out during the crisis. Size, expressed as log of 
total assets, and four orthogonalised non-standardised systemic risk measures (SRM), all computed in 2007Q2, are used as predictors. ES is log-
transformed by 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑆 + 1). Orthogonalised systemic risk is measured as the component of systemic risk that is orthogonal to Size. Panel A (B) 
shows results for the US (Europe). Detailed definitions of the systemic risk measures are shown in Appendix 2.  ***, ** and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. t-values have been computed with White (heteroscedasticity) standard errors. For specifications with significant 
systemic risk measure, the percentage of correctly classified banks is also reported, with the cup-off point being the ratio between the number of 
distressed banks and the total number of observations. 
 
Panel A: US banks     
 rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 0.33** 0.01 -1.58 0.07 
Size 0.70*** 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 
Pseudo R2 0.419 0.377 0.404 0.383 
No of Obs. 78 
 
Panel B: European banks     
 rSYR SRISK ΔCoVaR ES 
Non-standardised SRM 0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14* 
Size 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.57*** 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.206 0.206 0.267 
No of Obs. 54 
 
 
